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Electricity coverage in Latin America has increased substantially in recent decades, rising 
from 50% of the population in 1970 to more than 95% in 2015. Growth, however, 
slowed in the 1990s as many countries experienced difficulties in extending their 
networks further, in particular to serve those living in isolated and rural areas. In spite of 
this, the process of electrification was not interrupted and at the beginning of the 2010s 
decade most countries in the region were able to provide access to electricity to almost 
all of their populations. In this paper, we examine the main strategies used in Latin 
America to increase coverage and argue that only a combination of policy efforts has 
made it possible to achieve the current situation. We also examine the remaining 
obstacles, at policy and institutional levels, to achieving full coverage. 





Around 95% of the population living in Latin America (LA) by 2012 enjoyed access to 
electricity (Figure 1). This degree of coverage can be considered a success, given the low 
levels existing in some countries of the region already in 2000, when the UN Secretary-
General’s Advisory Group on Energy and Climate Change established the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs). Yet, the International Energy Agency (IEA) has calculated 
that still some 28 million people in LA remained without access to electricity in 2012, many 
of whom live in the rural areas of Haiti, Peru, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Argentina, Colombia, 
Bolivia and Honduras. Moreover, the high electrification levels throughout the region hide 
important differences in per capita consumption of the service. Thus, while consumption is 
high in Argentina, Uruguay, and Venezuela, for example, it is markedly lower in Bolivia, 
Nicaragua and Peru.  
Most studies analyzing the factors that determine the electrification process of developing 
countries have focused on economic and geographic conditions. For example, Lipscomb, 
Mobarak and Barham (2013) study the development effects of electrification in Brazil in 
the period 1960-2000 based on the geographic placement of hydropower plants. They 
show that placement depends on factors that are exogenous to the government and which 
can be predicted based on topographic characteristics, such as river gradient, water flow, 
and distance from the Amazon. However, electrification is also determined by demand 
characteristics, including concentration of industrial plants and population density. 
Wolfram et al. (2012) examined the patterns of electrification across the developing world 
and found that electrification is consistently correlated with GDP per capita. Other papers 
have stressed the importance of political institutions. Brown and Mobarak (2009) analyzed 
a group of 57 countries in the period 1973-1997 and showed that in poor countries 
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democratization has meant an increase in the proportion of residential consumption of 
electricity in relation to that of industrial consumption. This suggests that democratic 
governments better reflect the preferences of the population and dedicate more resources 
and efforts to electrification. Wolfram et al. (2012), in contrast, fail to find a correlation 
between electrification and the level of democracy, and suggest that if China has been more 
successful than India in electrifying the country it is because the pressure of a strong 
authoritarian government in China has facilitated infrastructure roll-out. 
Differences in levels of electrification and consumption not only reflect disparities in 
geographic, economic and political conditions, but also point to the adoption of different 
policies and regulations aimed at reducing the electrification gap. Taking this into account, 
the objective of this paper is to provide an overview of the electrification policies 
implemented in LA in recent decades, a subject that has received very little attention in the 
literature. On the one hand, we examine the universal access policies that have been adopted in 
most LA countries to extend the coverage of the electricity to all national territories. These 
policies have mainly involved extending existing electric systems to densely populated areas 
and promoting renewable energies, such as solar panels and mini-grids, in areas that cannot 
benefit from scale economies. On the other hand, we explain the adoption of universal service 
policies, which aim to make electricity affordable and to promote its use by low-income 
households (living in poor rural communities or in the suburbs of large cities) that are 
connected to the service. Specifically, we explain the design and the effects of the subsidy 
schemes implemented by most LA countries to make consumption affordable, and discuss 
problems of territorially isolated communities.   
Our paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 documents levels of electrification in LA. We 
show that most of the expansion of the service in the last couple of decades has taken place 
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in urban areas, with current electrification rates rising above 95% of the population in most 
of the countries. However, there are also significant differences in the level of electricity 
consumption across countries, implying that access to the service does not guarantee its 
use. In Section 3, we describe the main features of the process of liberalization and 
privatization in LA in the 1990s. We report some of the mixed opinions held about the 
overall outcome of these reforms. Drawing on recent evidence in Balza et al. (2013), we 
also underscore the importance of the creation of regulatory frameworks and the 
establishment of independent agencies to supervise competition. 
Sections 4 and 5 discuss the process of electrification in the rural areas of LA. We first 
introduce the stages in the evolution of the electrification programs of developing 
countries: namely, donor, market-oriented and participation paradigms (Martinot et al. 
2002; Kruckenberg, 2015). We then describe the various business models adopted to 
promote the creation of energy markets, including the dealer, concessionary and the 
community-led models (Glemarec 2012). Finally, we emphasize the role of off-grid 
technologies, such as solar panels and micro-grid systems, as essential mechanisms for 
completing the electrification process in rural areas.  
Section 6 reviews the universal service policies that are used in LA countries to 
complement policies of electrification (Pantanali and Benavides, 2006; OLADE, 2013). 
Specifically, most countries use subsidy schemes that help low-income users meet their 
connection costs and the price of the service. We also report some of the difficulties of 
designing social subsidies that incentivize consumption by the poor. 
Section 7 presents the case of Peru to illustrate some of the electrification policies 
implemented in LA. Peru’s case is especially interesting because it combines direct funding 
and regulatory innovations to stimulate private-sector participation as well as community 
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involvement. In common with many other countries in LA, Peru’s current coverage is very 
high in urban areas, but it has encountered many obstacles to completing the electrification 
of rural areas. Finally, the last section of the paper offers our main conclusions of the LA 
experience.   
Needless to say, guaranteeing access to electricity for all is a key element of development.1 
In the rural areas of developing countries, the main application of electricity is for light and 
watching television, given that most households are too poor to be able to afford other 
appliances, such as fridges or heating (Nieuwenhout et al., 1998; Khandker et al., 2012; 
Khandker et al., 2013). Many studies have identified the benefits of these applications for 
children’s education, as a result of the increase in the number of study hours, the 
acquisition of knowledge attributable to television, and the increase in the number of hours 
that parents dedicate to their children (Asaduzzaman et al., 2010; Barkat et al., 2002; Barron 
and Torero, 2015). Electricity also allows households to spend more time on leisure and 
productive activities, as women tend to work more hours outside of the home while 
children can attend school more frequently (van de Walle et al., 2013; Khandker et al., 
2013; Dinkelman, 2011). Likewise, electricity allows beneficiary households to increase 
their income and welfare, and to dedicate more time to non-agricultural activities (Grogan 
and Sadanand, 2013; Lipscomb, Mobarak and Barham, 2013; Chakravorty et al., 2014).  
Increased access to light and electricity also contributes to improving communications and 
the diffusion of information in remote locations, which in turn helps reduce poverty. In 
communities with electricity, inhabitants can spend more time talking with their neighbors 
at night, acquiring more knowledge – for example, on health-related issues – and they can 
                                                          
1 Since the seminal work of Aschauer (1989), several studies have analyzed the impact of infrastructure on the 




begin to plan the organization of collective service provisions. Electrification also has 
health-related benefits, reducing the use of biomass for cooking and moderating levels of 
household indoor pollution (Bruce et al., 2011). Indeed, pollutants emitted by solid fuels in 
inefficient cookstoves are a major factor in respiratory infections and infant mortality in 
LA. 
2.  Electrification rates in Latin America 
Since the eighties, governments, international donors and cooperation agencies have 
actively worked to boost the electrification of LA. Most of the resulting increase in 
coverage, as experienced in countries such as Bolivia, Peru and Honduras (Figure 1), has 
been generated in urban areas, where per capita income is higher, and the costs of 
expanding the grid are low. But electrification rates have remained low in rural areas, 
especially in Central America and the Andes. Indeed, more than 28 million people in LA 
remain without access to electricity, many of whom live in Haiti, Peru, Guatemala, 
Nicaragua, Argentina, Colombia, Bolivia and Honduras (Figure 2). Low coverage levels can 
be explained by the poverty of the population and the geographic conditions of some 
regions, but also by delays in the introduction of electrification policies and their 
inappropriate designs. On the other hand, it should be stressed that service provision in 
many rural areas is inefficient and unreliable. This means that major investment is still 
needed to modernize the grid and its management (Niez, 2010).  
Insert Figures 1 and 2 
Another salient feature of LA electricity markets are the significant differences in the levels 
of consumption across countries, which suggests that access to electricity alone does not 
mean that all consumers can reap all the benefits of the service. Figure 3 shows that while 
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per capita consumption is quite high in Argentina, Uruguay and Venezuela, it is 
significantly lower in countries like Haiti, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Bolivia, Honduras and El 
Salvador. Consumers in these latter countries may well not use the service due to high 
prices or because they cannot afford energy-using appliances.  
Insert Figure 3  
Among electrified households, consumption patterns might also differ significantly. Barnes 
et al. (2005) examined household fuel use in 45 cities from 3 continents and found that per 
capita total energy use is very similar across income classes, but that households with a 
high-income level tend to use more higher-energy-value fuels, such as electricity or gas. 
Moreover, middle-income households use about twice as much electricity as low-income 
households and rich households use about four times more. The World Bank (2008a) 
explains that although there are substantial variations by country, the expenditure by the 
poor on electricity is around one-half to two-thirds that of the non-poor. Thus, for 
example, the richest quintile of Uruguayan consumers uses only 1.3 times more electricity 
than the poorest quintile, but in Guatemala those in the richest quintile use 4.5 times more. 
Among the more specific problems rural and isolated communities face, we should 
highlight the difficulties that many Latin American countries encounter when trying to 
replace traditional cookstoves that use solid fuels with gas or electric stoves. Figure 4 shows 
that in many countries a significant percentage of the population still uses biomass for 
cooking and heating, rather than clean energies. For example, this is the case of 12.5 
million people in Brazil, 10.7 in Peru, 9.6 in Guatemala and 7.1 in Colombia (IEA, 2014).  
There is a broad consensus in the literature that households tend to replace traditional 
cookstoves with modern ones when their socio-economic situation improves (Hosier and 
Kipondya, 1993; Masera et al. 2000; Heltberg 2004; Pachauri and Spreng, 2004). However, 
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the challenges faced are rather more complex: low-income households usually consume a 
portfolio of fuels that are used for different tasks. For example, while they might boil water 
using modern stoves because it is faster and cleaner, they continue to make tortillas using 
traditional stoves because they consider it to be cheaper and the tortillas to taste better 
(Ruiz-Mercado et al., 2011, Hanna and Oliva, 2015). Access to clean cookstoves is even 
more difficult in isolated communities because they may not have ready access to gas 
cylinders, while it is difficult to adapt off-grid technologies for cooking2.  
Insert Figures 4 
3. The processes of electricity liberalization and privatization in LA 
Part of the increase in the access to and consumption of electricity described in the 
previous section can be attributed to the reform of the electricity markets that took place in 
LA at the end of the last century. Until the 1990s, power sectors in LA were mostly 
managed by vertically integrated state-owned firms; based on the rationale that  public 
monopolies could harness economies of scale, make an efficient use of scarce managerial 
skills and offer the service at an affordable price. By the mid-1990s, however, the economic 
situation of the region together with the inefficiencies and managerial problems of these 
firms led many governments to reform the sector. Many countries privatized their public 
monopolies and liberalized the energy market with the objective of attracting investors and 
promoting free-market competition (Victor, 2005; Calzada et al., 2009).  
                                                          
2 Organizations such as the Global Alliance for Clean Cookstoves (GACC), the World Bank and the 
Energizing Development Project fund programs to promote the use of clean kitchens in developing 
countries. Most of these programs target African and Asian countries, but projects are also run in Latin 




These pro-competition reforms were not unique to the energy markets but part of a 
broader movement toward the introduction of market forces into many sectors such as 
telecommunications, transport and water.3  The macroeconomic fluctuations of the 1970s 
and 1980s in most LA countries had a strong negative impact on public investment in the 
power sector. As the global economy slowed down, many countries simply could not 
afford to invest in their power sectors, leading to a decline in the quality of public services 
and multiple shortages in their provision. At the same time, consumer demand steadily rose 
due to the development of the region and the urbanization process, resulting in 
considerable dissatisfaction with public supply. Consumer prices in the state-owned power 
sectors were heavily subsidized, which meant state-owned power firms ran continual losses.  
Against this backdrop, energy sector reforms became a means for governments to gain 
much needed capital through the sale of public infrastructure, and to reduce public 
spending on subsidized tariffs (Wamukonya, 2003). International institutions were also a 
large driving force behind power sector reform. At this time, the ‘Washington Consensus’ 
pro-market doctrine was being embraced by institutions such as the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund. In 1993, the World Bank made power sector loans 
conditional on commitments to private sector participation and liberalisation (World Bank, 
1993). Many other institutions, including the Inter-American Development Bank, began 
similar practices shortly afterwards. 
Liberalization and privatization are often presented in the literature as attempts not only to 
improve efficiency in the power sector, but also to bring about a wholesale change in 
                                                          
3 Some scholars have criticized the market-oriented approach, suggesting that it favors the interests of the 
most privileged members of the society and “disempowers the state” (McCluskey, 2003). Moulian (1997) links 
this approach with the increase of poverty and inequality in Latin America. In the case of energy, Tironi and 
Barandiarán (2014) suggest that this approach was used as a rationale to end of the development of nuclear 
power in the 1970s in Chile. 
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ideology, with electricity going from a public service to a market commodity. Initially, 
power sector liberalization brought in much needed private sector investment to LA. By 
the end of the 1990s, the region had the largest share of private electricity projects among 
all developing regions worldwide. More than 38% of total investment in the developing 
world’s power sector was concentrated in LA (Henisz et al., 2005). Although the promised 
investment did arrive, it was largely concentrated in the more profitable areas with low cost 
and large demands, and opinions are mixed on the overall outcome of the reforms. 
However, there is evidence that the power sector reforms did bring about efficiency 
savings, while extending coverage, increasing consumption and reducing prices in several 
countries (Henisz et al., 2005 and Balza et al., 2013).  
The privatization process in LA countries often took place in conjunction with the vertical 
unbundling of the sector into its three basic business units - generation, transmission, and 
distribution. Most governments transferred generation, and to a lesser extent distribution 
and transmission, to the private sector. At the same time, they established new regulatory 
frameworks and market mechanisms to encourage competition. These transformations 
profoundly changed the institutional framework and the regulatory instruments available to 
supervise the sector, opening the door to new scenarios that favored the mix of public and 
private intervention to solve policy problems. For example, greenfield projects were 
auctioned off by public authorities across LA to stimulate the expansion of national grids 
to territories without coverage (Estache, Foster and Wodon, 2002). 
Balza et al. (2013) show that in LA the intensity of private investment in the power sector 
was not significantly related to an increase in coverage.4 By contrast, they do find that 
                                                          
4 In spite of this, investment in electricity did increase the quality of service and the efficiency of its 
generation, with a reduction in electricity losses and an expansion of generation capacity. 
12 
 
liberalization and the creation of independent agencies had a positive impact on the 
expansion of the service. During the 1990s, new regulatory models were established to 
introduce more competition in different areas of the market, especially in generation, but 
also in transmission and distribution. Moreover, price regulations and subsidy schemes 
were established to allow fair conditions for domestic consumption, regulated users and the 
financial sustainability of firms (Levi-Faur and Jordana, 2006).5 To implement these 
sophisticated regulations and provide some credible commitments to foreign investors, 
most countries created independent regulatory agencies, with highly qualified staff and with 
a strong organizational autonomy (Figure 5). At the same time, similar institutions were 
created for other basic services such as telecoms, transportation and water, as part of a 
large public sector reform. Expecting regulatory returns, governments delegated 
responsibilities to these newly created agencies in the areas of supervision, licensing, price 
setting and arbitrage, among other regulatory issues (Jordana and Levi-Faur, 2005; Jordana, 
2012). 
Insert Figure 5 
In recent years, a few countries in the region have partially reversed these policies due to 
changes in the political ideology of their governments and a certain disenchantment with 
the results of the reforms. This is the case of Bolivia, which in 2010 initiated a 
nationalization process that reversed many of the changes introduced in the 1990s and 
nationalized several firms, while in Venezuela several firms have been nationalized in the 
last few years. In spite of this, most LA countries have consolidated a model of regulated 
competition and have tried to offset the unwanted effects of liberalization by implementing 
                                                          
5 Murillo and Martínez-Gargallo (2007) show that even those countries that have introduced the strongest 
market liberalization policies and which have privatized their national incumbent operators maintain price 
controls and a strict regulation of the sector. 
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electrification policies. One obvious effect of privatization and liberalization is that private 
investors tend to focus their efforts on urban areas where they can exploit high-income 
consumers and benefit from economies of scale and density. In rural and remote areas, by 
contrast, the service is not profitable enough to attract the same degree of interest from 
investors. To compensate for this, since the nineties, national governments have 
implemented specific electrification programs. Some countries, such as Brazil and Peru, 
have passed specific rural electrification laws and many others have created rural 
electrification funds. In addition, most LA countries use social tariffs to boost the 
affordability of the service. The next sections explain the evolution of these programs and 
their results.  
4. Rural electrification strategies 
In the last decades, the complexity of electrifying the rural areas of developing countries 
has been recognized by domestic governments and international agencies. New programs 
have sought to adjust electrification strategies to the socio-economic and geographic 
conditions of each region, to adopt off-grid technologies in rural areas and to increase 
coordination between all institutions and local communities participating in the 
electrification process.  
4.1 Evolution of electrification policies 
Kruckenberg (2015a) identifies and describes three stages in the evolution of the 
electrification programs of developing countries. The first stage, the “donor paradigm”, 
occurred between the 1970s and the 1990s, when international donors and cooperation 
agencies intervened in rural areas through the diffusion of new technologies. Typically, 
these programs were based in the transmission of small-scale renewable-energy 
14 
 
technologies such as biogas, cookstoves, wind turbines and solar heaters, which were barely 
self-sustainable (Martinot et al., 2002). Development agencies sought to demonstrate to the 
local authorities and communities how these technologies could solve their energy needs. 
However, many of the projects suffered major shortcomings and failed: often they did not 
allocate resources to maintain and operate the equipment that was delivered to the 
communities, the beneficiaries were not trained to use or repair the systems, and there were 
no specific regulations or institutions available to guarantee the long-term sustainability of 
the projects (Martinot et al., 2002; Krukenberg, 2015a).  
The second stage, the “market-oriented paradigm”, was initiated after the 1992 UN 
Conference on Environment and Development (The Rio Earth Summit), when new forms 
of multilateral assistance were adopted for the diffusion of renewable energies, including 
solar home systems, biogas for lighting and cooking and small-scale mini-grids (Martinot et 
al. 2002). The new programs, designed by development agencies, aimed at promoting these 
technologies by creating business models for firms and cooperation agencies in which 
funding programs shouldered part of the costs and risks. These interventions were based 
on the expectation that renewable energies would be economically profitable in rural areas, 
but that their adoption would require giving some institutional and financial support to 
local firms. Many of these initiatives were adopted in the rural areas of countries such as 
Argentina, Brazil and Chile. However, usually they were only successful in richer 
communities that were already undergoing development and that had access to other 
public services such as water, telecommunications, health and education.  
This suggests that effective methods for targeting poor communities required private sector 
involvement to be complemented with more active public measures. Here, it should be 
recalled that in many LA countries the pro-market period coincided with a process of 
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administrative and political decentralization that transformed public policy-making in many 
different areas (Falleti, 2010). Faguet (2004), for example, reports that a major 
decentralization process in Bolivia led to greater investment in human capital and social 
services, as the country’s poorest regions were able to choose projects according to their 
greatest needs. This process was also characterized by significant drawbacks: some studies 
of the period warned that decentralization could be related to corruption and regulatory 
capture, since municipal governments were often at the mercy of local power elites 
(Bardhan, 2002). 
Finally, the third stage in electrification identified by Kruckenberg (2015a), the 
“participation paradigm”, was introduced in the early years of the new century. Many 
studies of rural electrification programs in developing countries have found that the impact 
and sustainability of the projects is usually constrained by persistent resource, capacity and 
participation limitations. In this sense, and contrary to traditional electricity technologies, 
the introduction of off-grid renewable technologies in rural areas requires the creation of 
new development pathways. Electrification programs today include a large variety of 
stakeholders (governments, development banks, bilateral and multilateral agencies, private 
enterprises and non-governmental organizations, utilities, micro-finance institutions) that 
need to be coordinated. In this context, partnerships between these organizations can help 
obtain the complementary resources, skills and knowledge that are necessary to promote 
sustainable off-grid solutions, and promote the participation of local communities 
(Kruckenberg, 2015b and 2015b; Morsink et al., 2011).6 
                                                          
6 Several recent papers provide examples of how different forms of inter-organizational relationships affect 
the sustainability of renewable energy partnerships. Kruckenberg (2015a) present six experiences in Central 
America. Ince et al. (2016) empirically analyze the role on informal institutions in Caribbean countries. 
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Cross-sector partnerships have become popular within formal debates on international 
development. Kruckenberg (2015a) explains that Target 8 of the UN’s Millennium 
Development Goals called for a new “global partnership for development” involving 
various collaborations between business and development agencies. For example, the 
World Summit for Sustainable Development in Johannesburg in 2002 called for “type II” 
partnerships between actors such as governments, international organizations, companies, 
NGOs, and scientific organizations, as a way to accelerate development (Forsyth, 2010).  
Within this new paradigm, electrification projects recognize the multi-level and cross-sector 
nature of socio-technical change. New projects seek to attract investment and create cost-
sharing models, foster knowledge transfer and capacity building, and improve the 
involvement of public policy initiatives and donor organizations with local communities. 
The main novelty of this approach is that it recognizes the importance of strong 
relationships between local stakeholders and policy entrepreneurs to foster the introduction 
of new technologies. According to Kruckenberg (2015a), strong ties between organizations 
facilitate fine-grained knowledge transfer, extensive collaboration and the development of 
problem-solving capabilities; whereas weak ties enhance access to non-redundant 
information and prevent the insulation of more durable partnerships in the wider sector. In 
spite of this, partnerships assisting in the uptake of off-grid solutions are also likely to face 
multiple knowledge gaps that have to be tackled in a dynamic process (Kruckenberg, 
2015b).  
 
                                                                                                                                                                          
Sovacool (2013) explores eight case studies in Africa and Asian countries. Finally, Schaffer and Bernauer 
(2014) analyze the relevance of partnerships between national governments and international institutions in 
26 EU countries. 
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4.2 Business models for rural electrification   
In recent decades, various methods of intervention have been adopted in developing 
countries, influenced by the electrification strategies defined above.7 We review here the 
main business models used (the dealer, the concessionary and the community-led model) 
and include a summary of this review in Table 1 of the Appendix. 
The “dealer model” was introduced in the eighties and harnesses pre-existing local retailers 
to sell energy-generating equipment – predominantly photo-voltaic (PV) solar technologies 
– directly to off-grid consumers. Its objective is to expand the market by making credit and 
partial subsidies available from qualified dealers. Specifically, policy intervention involves 
offering subsidies to local dealers to reduce the per unit installation cost of electricity 
systems. These subsidies are expected to be passed on to the consumers to create lower 
retail prices, thereby increasing demand and access, while also ensuring a profit for the 
dealers themselves (Glemarec 2012). However, in practice, the business model is difficult 
to implement because of the difficulties encountered in attracting dealers and due to their 
resistance to extend credits and subsidies to consumers. As a result, these programs are 
often concentrated in affluent regions with pre-existing networks of small-scale electricity 
supply firms that have the skills and technology required to supply services directly to 
consumers. While the dealer model was initially developed in various Asian and African 
countries, it can be found in LA applied in combination with other business strategies.8 For 
example, although the dealer model usually allows accredited dealers to sell anywhere in the 
country, in some World Bank projects in Honduras and Nicaragua subsidies are provided 
                                                          
7 Our descriptions of these models, as well as the explanation of the community-led model we offer below, 
are based on Barnes and Halpern (2001). See also Rolland (2011) and ADB (2015) to see examples for other 
regions. 
8 Barnes and Halpern (2001) explain that in Sri Lanka and Indonesia a combination of Global Environment 
Facility funds and World Bank credits were to be offered to dealers to on-lend to customers. 
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only for sales in designated priority areas. On the other hand, in Bolivia, the Decentralized 
Infrastructure for Rural Transformation Program specifies that the dealers must offer 
operation-and-maintenance services (World Bank, 2008b). 
The “concessionary model” was also introduced in the nineties in countries such as 
Argentina, Bolivia, Chile and Peru. It involves tendering to private firms the generation, 
transportation and distribution of electricity in rural and remote regions, while the 
government maintains the regulation and subsidization of the service. Since firms compete 
for the concessions, this mechanism should lead to cost reductions and better services. In 
spite of this, the concessionaires are responsible for running the service during the life of 
the contract, which means the public authorities have to monitor the quality of the services 
and ensure the equipment is maintained.  
In the concessionary model, an essential objective is to encourage private firms to compete 
for the concessions and to regulate the winners. Moreover, before the tender, public 
authorities must identify the country’s unprofitable regions in which the electricity sector 
needs to be expanded. Unattended regions can be split into different areas and the 
concessions for these regions can be tendered simultaneously or sequentially. In each 
region firms bid to obtain an exclusive contract to supply the service. The bids can reflect 
the number of households that the firm agrees to supply for a given public subsidy, or the 
minimum subsidy the firm requires for extending access to a given number of households. 
One advantage of this mechanism is that it is well targeted to meet the needs of rural 
communities: governments set tariffs that are affordable to the rural poor identified by the 
program. On the other hand, it uses market forces to select the provider in each region that 
is willing to offer the service at the lowest cost. Typically, the biggest hurdle is gaining 
sufficient competition in the tender process to keep firms’ subsidies low. If there is not 
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enough competition and subsidies are high, this model could be excessively costly (Barnes 
and Halpern, 2001; Calzada and Miralles, 2009). Concessionary tenders have been widely 
used across LA to distribute private sector concessions. For example, tenders have been 
used in Argentina under the Project for Renewable Energy for Rural Markets (PERMER) 
starting in 1999 (Best, 2011, Alazraki et al., 2007); the Rural Electrification Plan (REP) in 
Peru, beginning in 1993 and given new impetus in later periods, and the project Luz Para 
Todos (Light for All) launched in Brazil in 2003 (Gómez and Silveira, 2010).9 
A third approach adopted in recent projects is the “community-led model”. This could be 
viewed as a decentralized application of the concessionary model (bottom-up approach), 
typically geared toward off-grid and mini-grid electricity supply expansion. Local leaders, 
organizations, community members and entrepreneurs work together to produce a 
business plan to best serve the needs of their community.10 The project is submitted to a 
national regional agency, which, if approval is given, assigns partial funding through loans 
or subsidies for the installation or repair of infrastructure. New projects typically involve a 
financial contribution from the communities themselves, which is believed to invoke an 
attitude of community ownership and responsibility for long-term maintenance.  
One of the main criticisms of the concessionary model is that the projects developed by 
the concessionaires are largely disconnected from the interests of the local communities 
whom they serve. For example, the technology used by a concessionaire might not have 
                                                          
9 Calzada and Miralles (2009), Coelho and Goldermberg (2013) and Maurer and Barroso (2011) give a broad 
overview of concessionary auction mechanisms, with examples from Brazil, Colombia, Chile, Peru, Panama 
and Mexico from Latin America. 
10 Policymakers in developed countries are increasingly coming to view the community approach as a way to 
improve the results of renewable energy initiatives (Walker et al., 2010). This represents a significant shift in 
energy policy from focusing solely on large-scale, centralized technical systems to local, small-scale and 
collective approaches to sustainable energy generation, as advocated by alternative technology activists since 
the 1970s (Walker and Devine-Wright, 2008). The community approach, as used for example in community-
owned wind farms in the UK, can reduce local opposition and promote the choice of appropriate 
technologies at the local level. 
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enough capacity to meet the (perceived) needs of the communities, or may be installed in 
inadequate places. This argument is similar to the one used against the development of 
large-scale generation projects, including hydroelectric plants and large wind farms, which 
benefit the country as a whole but not the local community (Libert and Cacho, 2008). The 
community-oriented approach tries to overcome this limitation by engaging local 
governments and communities in the design of the projects and by developing local skills 
that are essential for the operation and maintenance of the equipment.11 In this sense, 
community-based and community-driven projects have been increasingly accepted by 
policy-makers as appropriate solutions for the provision of public services in rural and 
isolated areas. Local communities may have a better knowledge of the needs of the 
population and can be more willing to contribute financially to a project when they are 
entrusted with some level of decision-making. In spite of this, the biggest drawback of this 
model is its inability to generate economies of scale due to the small size of rural 
communities and the difficulty of generating diffusion effects across multiple communities. 
Moreover, as McGranahan (2015) points out, community-driven projects may have 
difficulties combining and coordinating local demand; obtaining the support of public 
authorities; persuading the community to develop affordable and sustainable projects; and 
achieving an adequate provision of all basic public services.12 
An example of community-based interventions is the rural electrification programs 
developed in Chile since 1994. The National Program for Rural Electrification (PER), the 
National Program on Rural and Social Energy (PERYS), the Huatacondo micro-grid 
                                                          
11 For a review of the literature examining demand-driven projects see Mansuri and Rao (2004 and 2013), 
Bardhan and Mookherjee (2005) and Yadoo and Cruickshank (2017).  
12 Mansuri and Rao (2004) also claim that community projects may not best reflect the preferences of rural 
communities and that they may fail both to create the adequate infrastructure and to improve welfare 
outcomes. Rigon (2014) explains that the management of these projects requires offering these communities 
training and resources, which national and local governments may have problems financing. When this 
occurs, these projects can be seen as a mechanism for passing the costs of development on to the poor. 
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project, or the Coquimbo Project has adopted bottom-up approach which has given a 
relevant role to local communities. In these projects, local communities are responsible of 
requesting the intervention, and they participate in the design, execution and sometimes the 
operation of the systems. In the case of the PER, operators were selected by the central 
government considering a number of criteria, including a cost-benefit analysis, the 
operators’ investment commitment, and the social impact of the project. The tender could 
cover only the initial installation or also the operation and maintenance of the 
infrastructure. On the other hand, the central government allocated subsidy funds to the 
regions based on the number of unelectrified households and the electrification of the 
region in previous years. Local consumers paid the connection costs from the distribution 
plant to their homes and the costs of wiring within their homes, roughly equivalent to 10% 
of the total project costs. Between 1995 and 1999, this model increased rural electrification 
in Chile by 50% (Jadresic, 2000; Tomkins, 2001; World Bank, 2008a). In the case of off-
grid systems, the involvement of the community has contributed to the success of the 
projects, such in the case of the Coquimbo Project developed in the period 2001-2012. 
However, a participative approach has not been applied in other cases. For example, in 
2010 a group of off-grid Photo-voltaic projects were implemented in southern Chile, with a 
high failure rate: harming system interventions from users occurred in 18% of the cases 
because of a lack of user training (Feron et al 2016). 
4.3 Financing electricity equipment 
A typical concern in many electrification projects is the high costs of installation. 
Microfinance schemes can be particularly helpful in overcoming the liquidity constraints 
associated with electrification projects. In regions with strong microfinance networks, 
consumer credit through microfinance institutions (MFIs) has been used to promote access 
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to clean energies systems (Glemerac, 2012). In LA, however, the current capacity of MFIs 
is insufficient to target rural areas and to unlock the potential of the energy market for 
microfinance loans (IEA, 2011). MFIs in LA are highly commercialized and currently 
geared toward urban and middle-income regions. Most micro-loans have been supplied to 
established micro-enterprises in need of capital for expansion, rather than to the rural poor 
in isolated regions (Morris et al. 2007). Unlike MFIs in Asia and Africa, few such 
institutions in LA explicitly provide energy lending portfolios. This has been attributed to 
poor government planning, with politically motivated promises of free giveaways of 
electrical services stifling demand for microfinance loans and hindering the market 
(Allderdice et al., 2007). MFIs have been involved in a small number of donor-led 
electrification programs such as World Bank/UNDP sponsored programs in Bolivia, the 
Dominican Republic, Honduras or Nicaragua. Each of these projects has used 
microfinance to help individual households and communities purchase solar electrification 
products. In all these cases, the loans have been embedded in broader business loans, 
rather than being explicitly given for energy purposes (Morris et al., 2007). In Honduras, 
for example, the Programme for Rural Electrification with Solar Energy (PROSOL) is 
executed by the Honduran Fund for Social Investment (FHIS), a governmental entity, 
through the Rural Infrastructure Project (PIR). While the first phase (2008-2013) was 
financed by GEF funds, the second phase is funded by the World Bank. The objective of 
the program is to make solar home systems affordable to rural users with limited financial 
capacity. PROSOL subsidizes part of the cost of the system and has allowed for the option 
of micro financing through a credit line managed by 6 micro finance institutions that can 




5. The use of sustainable technologies for rural electrification 
The main obstacle to the electrification of rural areas is the high cost of expanding the grid 
into low populated regions. Many of the households that remain without electricity in LA 
are in highly remote areas, for example in the Andes or in Amazonia, and their extreme 
poverty and high connection costs prevent them from attracting the interest of electricity 
distributors. In the late 1990s, most LA countries implemented specific electrification 
programs in their rural areas. Initial programs focused on expanding the grid to the more 
profitable consumers of urban and peri-urban areas. Centralized governments built large 
hydroelectric dams and power plants, as well as lengthy distribution and transmission lines. 
But the electrification of rural areas required a different strategy to control the amount of 
investment required, and, as a consequence, a difficult learning process was initiated. At 
first, top-down rural electrification programs were introduced, but implementation 
mechanisms were far from flexible. This resulted in significant policy failures and only 
small advances in electricity coverage, and more often than not negative externalities with 
regard to their impact on isolated communities.  
Today, donors, NGOs, private firms and communities collaborate with the governments to 
develop small-scale, localized energy generation systems.13  In rural locations, the adoption 
of renewable energies has emerged as a cost-effective solution, often with the use of off-
grid and small-scale systems. But success is not only technology driven: a tailor-make 
design of policy intervention, including well-calibrated instruments that are able to adjust to 
incorporate results from participatory processes in local communities, is also essential for 
                                                          
13 Several papers have analyzed the design of these programs (Brass et al., 2012; Sovacool and Drupady, 2012; 
Kruckenberg, 2015). Other studies have found that decentralized electrification can be more cost-effective 
than grid extension, even for communities that lie only 5 km from the grid (Adkins et al., 2010; Contreras, 
2008; Diniz et al., 2011). Palit and Chaurey (2011) analyze off-grid rural electrification in South Asia. 
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the success and sustainability of the projects. In particular, the way in which a new 
technology is socially introduced within a community, the way this technology empowers 
community members or, alternatively, makes them more dependent on external sources 
that extract revenue, are key factors in the introduction of the service in the communities 
and in the promotion of its use.  To be successful, instrument design and the choice of 
particular technological options in these programs needs to move beyond a technocratic 
rationale, based on the logic of cost efficiency. Taking into account the existing power 
relations within a community, gauging if they can be placed under stress, and the way in 
which the representation of these power relations might be altered with the introduction of 
electric power have to be given careful consideration in most cases.   
Renewable technologies, such as photo-voltaic panels, micro generators, hydroelectric 
plans and wind power have many advantages. They need less initial investment than is 
required by having to expand the electricity grid; they reduce the dependence on imports of 
fossil energies; they increase the security of provision by diversifying energy sources; they 
have lower environmental impacts; and their retail prices are lower than those of fossil 
fuels. Their main drawbacks, however, are that they might involve higher operative costs 
than hydroelectric or thermal plants, they are less attractive for private investors, and, in 
many cases, there is no operator to maintain the equipment. For this reason, renewable 
energies are often considered an intermediate step to the connection of households to the 
main grid, and a contribution to the social learning process. The idea is that they can 
facilitate access to the electricity service for many communities and that they can eventually 
be substituted should consumption increase sufficiently (ladder of investment).  
Photo-voltaic (PV) panels have been widely used as a cost-effective means for expanding 
electricity supply and their costs have fallen significantly in recent years (Glemarec, 2012). 
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Some authors claim that PV panels might generate dissatisfaction among users, because the 
limited power provided does not allow them to develop economic activities that require 
electric machinery, such as retail shops, grain mills, carpentry or sewing businesses. In 
addition, the social economic implications for the existing community order have to be 
examined very carefully. Coelho and Goldemberg (2013) have analyzed electrification 
programs in Brazil. They report that initially 50 kWh per month was sufficient to meet a 
family’s immediate needs, including light in the evening, the pumping of water, and 
television. But then electrified households started installing fridges and other electric 
equipment; they even began cooking with electricity. These authors argue that in this 
situation installing meters and charging for the electricity consumed becomes essential. 
Further limitations of PV panels include the fact that new businesses dependent on this 
technology cannot stay open late because the energy produced is insufficient to power their 
essential equipment (Green, 2004 and Hajat et al., 2009). 
Another major problem of PV panels is that they are usually installed by dealers 
(decentralized dealer model) and so there is no long-term contract established between 
consumer and retailer. This means panel and battery maintenance are dependent on the 
community members, who usually do not feel especially responsible for the equipment 
and/or do not have the capacity to maintain it (Barnes et al., 2001). As a result, when 
batteries are exhausted they may not be replaced.14 In spite of this, some new electrification 
projects do dedicate considerable efforts to advising household members on how to use 
and maintain solar panels, and they might even train local technicians to install the 
equipment and maintain them. This requires a political and social understanding of how the 
community works, and probably the establishment of participatory process that contribute 
                                                          
14 Obermaier et al. (2012) explain that, in Brazil, 56% of the equipment installed by the electrification 
programs at the end of the nineties (PRODEEM) was not in use a few years later. 
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to empower the community with the use and the control of the new technologies 
introduced. A good example of this is the Acciona MicroEnergy project in Peru, which has 
installed more than 5,000 PV panels since 2008, as well as being responsible for battery 
maintenance (Arraiz and Calero, 2015). 
An alternative to PV panels are micro-generators, which can be fueled by hydro, wind or 
thermal power, or by traditional fossil fuels. These technologies can also power mini-grid 
systems servicing small communities, although they are more expensive. According to 
Brass et al. (2012), diesel generators typically cost two to three times more per kilowatt-
hour than grid electricity and are susceptible to fluctuating fuel costs. In comparison, 
renewable systems are often cost competitive, but require higher upfront costs per end 
user.15 
Micro-generators are also limited in terms of their generation capacity, with their ultimate 
suitability and cost effectiveness being determined by the characteristics of the local 
environment. In Brazil, in 2008, there were 1,267 small, diesel-fueled, power plants (Coelho 
and Goldemberg, 2013). The strategy adopted by this country of extending electricity lines 
to slum areas and distant villages has succeeded in universalizing access to electricity. 
However, because of the difficulties and costs to create and maintain these plants, many 
new projects have adopted renewable energies. 
Many LA countries use hydroelectric plants to generate electricity, but usually they produce 
several megawatts in order to benefit from scale economies. By contrast, the adoption of 
small hydroelectric plants remains quite limited. Taking into account the rainfall rates and 
                                                          
15 Brass et al. (2012) review an extensive literature on distributed generated projects and offer different 
estimates of the costs of adopting renewable energies.  
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the high topographic relief of many countries, the use of small plants would be especially 
appropriate for many remote areas, for example in the Andean mountains.  
A further solution for rural areas is the use of wind power systems that incorporate 
batteries within the homes to store electricity. However, it is estimated that wind turbines 
are only more economical than PV systems in areas with high average wind speeds (Fuente 
and Álvarez, 2004).   
As discussed above, one limitation of off-grid systems is that they cannot be so readily 
adapted to an expansion in consumption. Hence, the success of electrification projects 
might in part depend on the firms’ and on the government’s ability to make accurate 
predictions about the future evolution of consumption in each place (Gertler et al., 2011). 
In the case of the rural regions connected to the grid, a potential problem is also the 
existence of a low generation capacity (Crousillat et al., 2010). In these instances, in order 
to extract the full benefits of electrification, grid expansion has to be complemented with 
an increase in generation equipment. 
Finally, it should be stressed that the presence of renewable energies for the production of 
electricity in LA today is significant, although their use in rural areas is relatively recent and 
remains modest. According to the International Energy Agency (IEA), renewable energies 
currently represent around 29% of total energy production in LA, and according to 
OLADE they account for 25% of total production in LA and the Caribbean (Figure 6). 
This is a relatively high figure compared to the 5.7% share renewable energies represents in 
the OECD countries. In practice, however, most of the renewable production in LA is 
generated by the large hydroelectric plants and by biofuels.  
Insert Figure 6 
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In recent decades, the price evolution of fossil fuels, climate change, increases in energy 
consumption, plus the energy crisis experienced by various countries have alerted 
policymakers to the need to reduce their dependency on the traditional energy supply 
system (Scrasse et al., 2009). Yet, despite measures aimed at reducing energy consumption 
and the promotion of alternative energy technologies, most LA countries remain highly 
dependent on fossil fuels to meet demand. As Verbong and Loobach (2012) explain, most 
societies have adapted to the fossil-based energy system so that changing the organization 
of the supply and usage of energies presents many major challenges: new technologies 
compete with each other, dominant technologies are placed under pressure, and different 
actors, authorities and institutions may have conflicting interests as to how best to 
implement new strategies (Grin et al., 2010). An additional barrier for the environmental 
groups that support renewable technologies is their limited influence on research agendas 
(i.e. the “undone science”, as explained by Hess, 2007).16 
Energy systems are characterized by their complexity, uncertainty and inertia, which means 
that we have to consider many actors when analyzing their transformation. An important 
challenge facing electrification projects is being able to take into account the differences in 
needs and preferences of local communities. In recent years, Science and Technology 
Studies (S&TS) have shown a willingness to seek global solutions to energy and 
                                                          
16 Hess (2007) explains that when alternative technologies and practices, such as most renewables, are taken 
to a bigger scale, they are transformed into something that is more compatible with established mainstream 
options, although less adapted to the specific needs of local communities. On the other hand, Jasanoff and 
Martillo (2004) argue that identifying which issues require global attention is a matter of power and resources, 
including scientific resources. 
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environmental problems. However, various authors have explained that global solutions to 
environmental problems must be coupled with new opportunities for local solutions.17  
6. Universal service policies and social tariffs 
Most countries in LA complement their electrification policies with universal service 
policies that seek to make the service more affordable for electrified households. 
Specifically, most countries use subsidy schemes that help low-income users meet their 
connection costs and the price of the service.18 This practice contrasts with the trend in 
OECD countries to eliminate social tariffs, where they are believed to create inefficiencies 
and to have little impact on the energy poor. In LA, social tariffs constitute an essential 
part of social policies and might have an important redistribution effect (Pantanali and 
Benavides, 2006). In many cases, social tariffs have been created to moderate the increase 
in energy prices following the introduction of renewable energies and plans to increase 
market efficiency or to protect the vulnerable population in periods of economic 
difficulties. Thus, for example, in Argentina social tariffs were introduced after the 2001 
crisis.  
In most countries, social tariffs are tied to energy consumption, although several countries 
also link them to other indicators such as the geographical location of the households or 
measures of household income. For example, in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia and 
Peru the beneficiaries of social tariffs have to be included on the census as low-income 
consumers. In these countries it is believed that electricity consumption is not sufficient on 
                                                          
17 Howe (2015) argues that if solutions to global climate change have to be applied, “they will require 
analyzing projects and policies that are touted as planet-preserving (the universal appeal) as well as those 
projected to benefit local populations (the particular appeal)”. In the same line, Jasanoff and Martello (2004) 
explain that local self-sufficiency and placed-based identities continue to be important for effective 
environment governance. 
18 Some exceptions are Barbados, Belize, Costa Rica, Grenada and Guyana (OLADE, 2013). 
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its own to determine household income and other variables, such as the size and location 
of households, are used to determine their energy needs. In Peru, the SISFOH (Sistema de 
Focalización de Hogares) is a system that collects information about the households 
socioeconomic characteristics and which calculates a poverty index that allows households 
to be classified into seven categories or strata. This information is then used by different 
national agencies to determine the beneficiaries of social programs. 
Some countries, including Peru, Ecuador and Nicaragua, finance social tariffs with cross-
subsidies, but there are other countries in which cross-subsidies are not allowed and social 
tariffs are financed by the electricity companies or with a direct contribution from the State. 
For example, in Peru and the Dominican Republic, social tariffs are financed by those users 
that consume more than 100 and 500 Kwh per month, respectively. In Argentina cross-
subsidies are forbidden and social tariffs are supported by public funds, while in Brazil 
tariffs are financed out of the Global Reversion Reserve, funded with payments from the 
energy providers. 
OLADE (2013) has analyzed the use of social tariffs in LA and shows that in most 
countries, the percentage of beneficiaries of these tariffs is higher than the percentage of 
people living below the poverty line, and higher than the percentage living below the 
extreme poverty line.19 Figure 7 shows that some exceptions are Bolivia, the Dominican 
Republic and Paraguay, and even in these countries the percentage of people obtaining 
subsidies is higher than the percentage living below the extreme poverty line. In this 
                                                          
19 CEPAL (2014, p. 64) defines the poverty line as the minimum income required to meet a person’s basic 
needs. It is based on the value of a basket of basic food necessary to cover the nutritional needs of the 
population, taking into account consumer habits, the availability of food and the prices in each country. The 
extreme poverty line additionally includes the income required by households to meet their basic non-food 
needs. This measure takes different values in urban and rural areas and changes each year. 
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respect, there may be political and technical circumstances that make it difficult to prevent 
non-poor households receiving subsidies. Komives et al. (2005) warn of the complexities of 
designing social subsidies that only incentivize consumption by the poor. For example, they 
report that in Guatemala and Colombia many non-poor households figure among the low-
volume customers that may benefit of social tariffs. In urban Colombia, the poorest 
quintile consumes more than the subsistence level. Yet, the administrative and political 
costs of improving the selection of the beneficiaries of these tariffs can be high.  
Insert Figure 7 
OLADE (2013) reports considerable differences in the maximum consumption levels 
established at which consumers can benefit from subsidies. These range from 70 
kWh/month in Bolivia to 900 kWh/month in Mexico (this threshold applies in the 
summer season and in some specific regions). In spite of this, most countries adopt a limit 
between 200 and 300 kWh/month, and many countries offer a range of consumption 
levels with different discounts. Thus, for example, in Peru there is an initial range for 0-30 
kWh/month and another for 30-100 kWh/month. In Ecuador, there are three thresholds: 
110 kWh/month in the Sierra, 130 kWh/month on the Coast, and 120 kWh/months for 
the elderly. These differences are justified on the grounds that there is no single general 
consumption level that reflects the needs of all households. Clearly, the consumption 
requirement might depend on the size of the family, the geographic location of the 
household, the season of the year, and cultural habits.  
The discounts applied to the regular tariff vary according to the country and the 
consumption level. Many countries apply decreasing subsidies. For example, in Peru the 
subsidy is 62.5% for consumption between 0 and 30 kWh/month and 49% for a 
consumption between 31 and 100 kWh/month. By contrast, in Ecuador the subsidy is 50% 
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for the three ranges used. The countries that apply the smallest subsidies are Nicaragua 
(15%) and Bolivia (25%), and the countries that apply the highest discounts for specific 
groups of consumers are Argentina and Brazil (100%) (OLADE, 2013). The use of these 
increasing subsidies is considered important in giving the right consumption signals to 
consumers. Subsidies modify the consumption patterns of households and should not 
stimulate unnecessary consumption and waste.  
Finally, another interesting aspect of OLADE’s report is that it estimates the impact of 
social tariffs on the budgets of beneficiary households that are below the extreme poverty 
line, according to the World Bank’s definition (households that obtain less than 1.25 US$ 
per day per household member, for a family of five members, i.e., 2,281 US$/year). After 
making various assumptions, they found that in several LA countries, including Bolivia, 
Honduras and Peru, the impact of social tariff was small, since it only increased the 
acquisitive power of these households by less than 30 US$/year, which represented around 
1% of their annual income (Figure 8). The highest impact was found in the Dominican 
Republic and Mexico, where households below the extreme poverty line obtained 235 and 
493 US$/year, respectively, which was around 10 and 21% of the households’ income. In 
spite of these results, there is still a shortage of information on how subsidies can change 
the consumption patterns of the population.  
Insert Figure 8 
Subsidies seek to improve opportunities to use modern energy options at affordable costs. 
But some authors consider that social tariffs often fail to achieve this policy objective and 
suggest the use of alternative measures, such as direct welfare payments or investments in 
social services. Komives et al. (2005) argue that the absence of any administrative selection 
of subsidy beneficiaries might mean that subsidies are regressive: both because many poor 
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households do not have an electricity connection, and because those with a connection use 
less electricity than rich households. In this sense, the adoption of a progressive distributive 
policy would mean that a large part of the population do not receive any subsidy.  
Another criticism of subsidy programs is that they can distort firms’ long-term investments. 
McRae (2015) has identified an important anomaly that affects subsidy programs in 
Colombia. Subsidies should create sufficient demand in poor neighborhoods to encourage 
private operators to improve distribution networks. But he explains that, paradoxically, 
many Colombian regions receiving large subsidies have precarious distribution networks. 
This generates a vicious cycle: households with informal connections receive low quality 
service for which they do not pay; distribution firms tolerate nonpayment because they 
receive financial support from the government; and the government subsidizes these users 
to retain their political support and to avoid civil conflict. The explanation for this situation 
is that governments cannot observe real consumption levels and, as a consequence, in areas 
with a large number of informal connections, the fiscal transfers firms receive are higher 
than the cost of providing the service. Since the profits obtained are high, the incremental 
profit from improving the network is lower than the capital cost. As a result, operators opt 
not to invest in the expansion and upgrading of their networks.  
Similar distortions attributable to subsidies have been described in other countries. On the 
one hand, Krishnaswamy and Stuggins (2007) explain that in the Dominican Republic the 
government paid 75% of the cost of the electricity used in informal settlements, and this 
policy incentivized firms to expand the number of households included in the program. On 
the other hand, Rehman et al. (2012) explain that in the “Big Five” countries of Asia 
inefficient subsidies have distorted the utilities’ incentives to invest. All in all, these papers 
conclude that government policies aimed at maintaining services for nonpaying, unmetered 
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households may perpetuate the existence of low-quality connections by creating a 
disincentive for distribution companies to invest, even when the investments result in the 
households paying for the service. McRae (2015) suggests addressing this problem by 
making the subsidies dependent on the quality of the service and shifting out household 
demand in order to increase the profitability of upgrading the distribution networks. 
7. A case study: Peru’s electrification process  
Peru’s experience of electrification is interesting in the sense that it has sought to combine 
direct funding and regulatory innovations to stimulate private participation as well as 
community involvement. However, electrification in Peru is still characterized by major 
shortcomings.20 In 2012, although coverage in urban settings was already close to 99%, it 
reached just 65% of the population in rural areas. Amazonian and Andean departments 
were the territories with the lowest levels of electrification, owing to a highly dispersed 
rural population and very difficult terrain. According to the IEA, in 2014, more than 2.5 
million people did not yet have access to electricity in the country. 
During the 1990s, most of the Peruvian electricity sector was privatized, particularly as 
regards energy generation and distribution. Efforts were made to attract investment so as 
to increase electricity generation and to renew its distribution networks. Later, during the 
2000s, transmission networks were also privatized. At that time, the country’s policy 
priorities were focused on improving the efficiency of the electricity system as a whole, and 
coverage was expanded rapidly as a consequence of increasing electricity production. To 
attract investment, companies were under no obligation to connect users lying more than 
100 meters from their networks, a measure that possibly impeded a more rapid increase in 
                                                          
20 For a general analysis of the energy sector in Peru see Fontaine (2010), Leung and Jenkins (2014), Calzada, 
Costas and Jordana (2009) and Quintanilla (2009).  
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coverage. However, already in the early 2000s, two key instruments were adopted to 
address the electricity gap in the country and to expand universal coverage.  
First, in 2001 the government created the FOSE (Fondo de Compensación Social Eléctrica -
 Electricity Social Compensation Fund), a cross-subsidy system to adjust electricity tariffs, 
which included a reduction in tariffs for customers with an energy consumption below 100 
kWh/month using fixed and proportional discounts. This fund was managed by the 
electricity regulatory agency, OSINERGMIN, financed through a surcharge in the tariff 
paid by regulated consumers with monthly consumptions above 100 kWh, and benefited 
about 60% of electricity users in the country. Second, the Ministry of Energy and Mines 
directly invested in rural electrification, a process implemented by the National Rural 
Electrification Office (DGER) and other related agencies. Following the construction of 
these electricity systems, they were handed over either to state-owned distribution 
companies or to the municipalities for operation. The combined effect of all these efforts 
contributed to a significant increase in rural electrification, climbing from 24% in 2001 to 
65% in 2012.   
In 2006, a fund (Mecanismo de Compensación para Sistemas Aislados, MCSA) was introduced to 
supplement and rebalance the tariffs of off-grid systems. The objective of this fund, 
financed by electricity customers and complemented with government funds, was to 
guarantee that grid and off-grid costs are the same, from the point of view of private 
investors. Off-grid customers only pay 20% of the tariff and off-grid generation companies 
are compensated from the fund’s resources. This social tariff for off-grid systems 
constitutes an innovative measure in LA.  
However, in 2012 a broader program, the FISE (Fondo de Inclusión Social Energético), aimed at 
providing a more comprehensive solution to energy coverage shortcomings, was 
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introduced. This fund promotes a universal energy service and is financed by the State, 
energy firms, and large electricity and gas users. The FISE seeks to expand energy coverage 
across the country, develop compensation mechanisms for residential consumers, and 
promote renewable technologies, including solar panels, for electricity generation in off-
grid areas (Law 29852, 2012). Led by the Peruvian government and temporarily managed 
by OSINERGMIN, the FISE has implemented several innovative initiatives, including the 
distribution of vouchers to promote the use of liquid petroleum gas cookstoves and the 
reduction of electricity prices for final consumers in rural areas (initiated in 2016). It has 
also sought closer collaboration with private firms in strategic areas with the objective of 
reducing public investments. 
Another example of the Peruvian government’s efforts to complete the electrification 
process in the country is its organization of several universal service auctions. Their 
objective is to offer the lowest possible subsidies to companies investing in electricity 
generation in designated places, making use of renewable technologies. In 2013, the 
government auctioned 240 MW, which were allocated to 19 small hydroelectric systems. In 
2014, it organized the first auction for the provision of off-grid systems in rural areas, and 
the winning firm obtained a concession for the installation, operation and maintenance of 
500,000 autonomous solar panel systems. Finally, in 2016 the government auctioned 1300 
GWh, the stipulation being that they have to be provided by renewable energies such as 
biomass, wind and solar systems, and 450 GWh to be provided by hydroelectric plants 
generating less than 20 MW (Quintanilla, 2016). Overall, this large-scale initiative is highly 
characteristic of the concessionary model, but it includes two particular innovations. First, 
it uses solar panels to cover almost all the territory and, second, it involves close 
collaboration between the Ministry and the regulatory agency in the design and 
management of the universal service policy (FISE, 2016).   
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8. Conclusions and policy implications 
The electrification process in Latin America can be considered a success story. By the end 
of 2015, 95% of the population had access to electricity, up from just 50% in 1970. As 
such, the LA experience can serve as an example for many countries in Africa and Asia 
where coverage levels continue to be low despite many decades of electrification efforts. 
The main drivers of electrification in LA have been related to economic growth and 
democratization. Power sector reforms, characterized by privatization and regulated market 
competition, have also attracted investment at crucial points in the process, but more 
significantly, the establishment of independent regulatory agencies has provided policy 
stability and transparency.  
However, 28 million people in LA are still without access to electricity. Many of these 
people live in remote, rural areas, where extending the electricity network is extremely 
challenging. Innovation, especially in the form of new renewable energy technologies, is 
proving essential in extending access to electricity without having to expand the electricity 
network. But the implementation of rural electricity policies is often ineffectual, resulting in 
policy failures. Moreover, these efforts may be subject to the vested interests of large firms 
and intermediaries, both local and multinational (Howe et al., 2015). To mitigate these 
problems and achieve the political goal of full coverage, electrification projects need to be 
adapted to the socio-economic and geographic conditions of the area. These projects also 
need to promote the close coordination of all the institutions and local communities 
involved in the electrification process. In this regard, a particularly relevant area for further 
research would be an examination of the characteristics of the community-based projects 
implemented in the region over the last decade.  
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The Peruvian case (presented in the last section of the paper) is a clear example of a new 
generation of public policy that can be used to attaint full electricity coverage in a more 
coherent and active fashion. After many years of fragmented and limited initiatives, the 
FISE program (2012) combines a variety of regulatory instruments and public resources 
with the objective of universalizing access to and the use of clean energies. This initiative 
has been complemented with several universal service auctions aimed at completing the 
electrification of rural areas with the use of off-grid technologies.  
The next challenge the continent faces is to increase its overall consumption levels. Indeed, 
in spite of the successful expansion of electricity coverage in the region, per capita 
consumption is very low compared to that of developed countries, and there are huge 
disparities in consumption levels between and within countries. Social tariffs and subsidies 
are the traditional instruments used by LA governments to foster consumption, but it has 
probably been the economic growth of the last few years that has enabled millions of 
people to escape poverty and to begin to purchase electrical equipment (such as fridges and 
heating systems) that has induced the biggest increase in energy consumption. Increasing 
consumption levels in rural and isolated areas is a much more difficult objective and will 
require a different set of policy instruments. On the one hand, many communities in these 
areas live below the poverty line and lack access to other basic services, such as roads, safe 
water and telecommunications that might act to spur their development.21 This means that 
electrification strategies there cannot rely on marker-oriented solutions. On the other hand, 
the electrification of these regions has been based on off-grid renewable energies, which 
make it possible to use basic services such as light and television, but not other appliances 
                                                          
21 Electrification has a greater impact if complemented by investment in water, education, health and 
infrastructure. New initiatives have been adopted in recent years that seek the integrated management of 




that consume more energy, such as fridges, clean stoves and agricultural machinery. In the 
coming years, the countries of LA will have to define the quality of the electricity service 
they want to offer their rural communities and they will need to verify whether the 
technological solutions they currently offer are appropriate for meeting this goal. 
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